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8. The union as broker of employment rights
Stewart J. Schwab
Most employment-law rights are mandatory. Individual workers cannot decline the 
protections the law gives them. For example, a nonexempt worker must get at least $7.25 
per hour and time-and-a-half for overtime, even if she would agree to less. A worker’s 
pension must vest within five years. If she is injured on the job, a worker is entitled to 
compensation through a state system and cannot opt out in advance.
Interestingly, in these examples and others like them, the law forces its protection only 
on nonunionized workers. Unions in a collective bargaining contract can bargain away 
these rights, acting as broker in return for something more valuable to their workers.
This chapter examines the choice between waivable and mandatory employee rights 
and, in particular, whether some rights should be mandatory for individual workers 
but subject to negotiation by labor unions. Section I sets the stage with two examples. 
Section II explores why most employee rights are mandatory. Section III asks whether 
unions should be allowed to waive (or broker, to use a more palatable term) employee 
rights even when individuals cannot. Section IV documents the large degree to which 
current employment law already has this feature of mandatory individual rights that 
unions can broker. Section V then explores whether unions and society should welcome 
the role of union as broker.
I.  OPENING EXAMPLES OF UNION AS BROKER
Let me give two contrasting examples of union as broker to set the stage. The first 
example clearly shows the value of union waiver in some settings. The second example 
is the arbitral versus judicial forum, which is a more problematic use of union waiver.
Example 1: Union waiver of the eight-hour day for miners.  Consider the gold-mining 
industry on the California-Nevada border. Mining is brutal work, so in 1909 the 
California legislature passed a statute prohibiting work shifts longer than eight hours 
for underground miners.1 While this statute may make sense in general, it did not opti-
mally serve miners in San Bernardino County. Most miners there live far from the mines 
and commute three hours a day on narrow, winding roads to get to work. Because of 
the dangerous and tiring commute, they prefer a shorter workweek with 12-hour shifts 
compared to a longer workweek with eight-hour shifts. In 1983, the legislature amended 
the statute to permit 12-hour shifts if agreed to in a collective bargaining contract.2 The 
unionized mines soon adopted 12-hour shifts, and the nonunion mines found themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage. After unsuccessfully petitioning the state labor agency 
for a waiver, they filed suit asking the federal court to strike down the more lenient 
treatment the statute gives for unionized mines. The district court held that the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempts the state double standard; but the Ninth Circuit 
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reversed and upheld the state statute allowing unionized mines to have 12-hour shifts 
while nonunion mines could have only eight-hour shifts.3 In rejecting an equal protec-
tion challenge, the appellate court emphasized the greater bargaining power of unions, 
declaring that the legislature could rationally have believed that unionized workers have 
greater power to ensure safe working conditions than workers with individual employ-
ment agreements.
Four messages come from the example. First, one need not criticize the general law 
(here, the eight-hour shift rule) in order to see a valid role for union brokering of the 
law as applied to particular situations (here, to mines in a particular county with unique 
commuting patterns). Second, it illustrates that legislatures hesitate to allow individual 
workers to waive rights, for fear that their lack of bargaining power will force them to 
waive without any gain. Third, the example shows how unions can use legislative waivers 
to make unionized firms more competitive, benefiting their firms and their members. 
Finally, in this case the waiver was in the overall social interest as well as the workers’ 
and the union’s interest, but this point needs to be examined for particular statutes.
Example 2: Union or individual waiver of the right to court.  Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was a landmark anti-discrimination statute, giving employees the right 
to go to federal court (after filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission) to complain of discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or 
national origin. Title VII was the model for other anti-discrimination statutes protecting 
workers against, among other things, age and disability discrimination. The hallmark 
of these statutes was the right to haul the employer into federal court. Employers com-
plained (Olson, 1997) as the number of discrimination claims skyrocketed (Clermont 
& Schwab, 2004). One response of employers to the burden of discrimination cases 
has been to create arbitration procedures for these claims, whether through the union 
grievance-arbitration system or, in a nonunion setting, through contracts with individual 
employees.
Whether unions or individual workers can waive the right to go to court over dis-
crimination and other statutory claims (or, inversely, whether a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement is enforceable) has a winding legal history and remains hotly contested. In 
its Alexander v. Gardner-Denver (1974) decision, the Supreme Court held that a union-
ized employee could bring a statutory discrimination claim to court, even though the 
employee had already lost an arbitration claim of unjust termination brought through 
a union grievance-arbitration procedure created by a collective bargaining agreement. 
Gardner-Denver’s effect was that a union could not waive an individual employee’s right 
to go to court. In its later Gilmer (1991) and Circuit City (2001) decisions, the Supreme 
Court distinguished the union context of Gardner-Denver and enforced an agreement of 
individual employees to bring all statutory claims to arbitration, waiving their right to 
court. The Court emphasized a “tension between collective representation and individual 
statutory rights” that is not present when individuals agree to arbitration (Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 22).
More recently, the Court revived the union as broker of the right to a judicial forum. 
In 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett (2009), the Court upheld a collective bargaining agreement in 
which the union had agreed to arbitrate all employment discrimination claims arising 
under the ADEA. Finding nothing in the statute to preclude this choice of arbitral 
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forum and satisfied that arbitration would protect the employees’ substantive right to 
be free from discrimination, the Court refused to interfere in the bargained-for exchange 
between employer and union.
Both union and individual waivers of the right to go to court are controversial and in 
flux. Bills in Congress are afoot to reverse 14 Penn Plaza and deny unions the power to 
waive their members’ right to a judicial forum. Other bills propose to go further back in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and reverse Circuit City and Gilmer by denying individual 
workers the power to waive a judicial forum to vindicate discrimination claims.4 Indeed, 
the Franken Amendment now forbids government contractors from requiring workers 
to arbitrate title VII claims and other sexual harassment claims, although the language 
of this recent statute does not clearly cover collective agreements as well as individual 
agreements.5
All this turmoil invites two sets of questions, for individual waiver and union waiver: 
(1) Should individual workers want the power to waive a judicial forum for discrimina-
tion claims, and is it good public policy for individual workers to have this power; and
(2) should unions want the power to waive a judicial forum for its members’ discrimi-
nation claims, and should their members and public policy want unions to have this
power?
On the individual-waiver questions, it is hard to distinguish whether individual 
workers should want the power from whether it is good public policy to allow it. In 
either case, as we will see, the concern is that an individual worker has little bargain-
ing power and may have limited information and cognitive biases that prevent an 
 appropriate decision.
On the union-waiver set of questions, the union may want this power as another chip 
in its bargaining arsenal. On the other hand, as we will explore, unions may feel that 
having the option to waive weakens their bargaining position or is not worth the expo-
sure to costly duty of fair representation lawsuits if they do not arbitrate every case or 
make mistakes in the arbitral process. (It is worth pointing out that the union in 14 Penn 
Plaza argued against letting the collective bargaining agreement waive a judicial forum, 
although it is hard to reconcile this litigation position with their actual bargaining behav-
ior.) But even if unions want this power, it may not be in all of their members’ interest, 
particularly minority members who may more highly value the right to go to court with 
discrimination claims than most members, who do not think much of this right. Unions 
have a long, albeit complicated, legacy of selling out the position of minority members. 
Finally, it is a distinctly third question whether public policy supports allowing union 
waiver in this context.
II.  THE MANDATORY NATURE OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
A.  The Rationale for Employment Laws
At its nineteenth-century, common-law, laissez-faire zenith, employment law gave most 
rights to employers, subject in principle to contractual waiver of the pro-employer 
default. For the last 100 years, workers have turned to the legislature (and more 
recently to the common-law courts) to change the rules. Employment laws often impose 
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substantial costs on employers, and employers have vociferously complained. Various 
types of arguments justify employment laws, and often more than one for any particular 
law.
The usual rationale is that employment laws further some public policy. Society does 
not like the results of the “unregulated” labor market and so it intervenes. Within the 
broad category of intervention in the name of public policy are two types of intervention. 
First, the legislature may think that market imperfections lead to inefficient results that 
need correcting. Second, the legislature may think the market reaches results that are 
unfair, regardless of their efficiency.
An example of the first type – intervening to improve the efficiency of labor markets 
– may be the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (Freeman, 1976). A
competitive labor market may provide too few pensions, in the sense that workers would
prefer more of their compensation to be in the form of pensions than current wages. In
a competitive market, employers look at the behavior of persons just deciding whether
to work in determining the value of their pension package (i.e., firms look at whether
employees are queuing up for the job or whether it is difficult to fill). But these new
entrants are often younger workers, who value pensions less than most workers in the
existing workforce. The older workers are trapped in their firms, however, and cannot
easily signal their dissatisfaction with the level of pensions by quitting. In short, the
market will be inefficient because pension rates are set according to the preferences of
incoming workers who, relative to their older counterparts, prefer more in current wages
and less in pensions. To remedy this, Congress enacted ERISA to encourage a higher
level of pensions that workers could count on.
Probably more employment legislation is enacted because unregulated labor market 
outcomes are deemed too harsh rather than inefficient. Some of this legislation has dis-
tributive aims; the goal is to favor some or all workers, regardless of whether the overall 
pie grows or shrinks (Jolls, 2000). Some legislation is paternalistic. Even if workers are 
willing to trade safety for higher pay, for example, society is unwilling to allow it. The 
flip side of paternalism is that individuals may believe they could make themselves better 
off with their individual bargains than with the legislation. Where that is the case, the 
costs imposed by the legislation are greater than the benefits (measured by willingness 
and ability to pay) of the legislation. As I will show below, this means that people believe 
they can make themselves better off by rejecting the legislation.
Not all employment legislation is enacted with noble public policy as the goal, whether 
efficiency-enhancing or distributive. The public-choice theory of legislation emphasizes 
the coercive power of law and suggests that self-interested groups lobby for legislation 
that furthers their interests – rather than some larger public interest (Macey, 1986; 
Eskridge, Frickey & Garrett, 2000). A favorite employment-law example of public-
choice theorists is the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
(29 U.S.C. § 206). Such legislation sets a floor on competition between workers for jobs. 
Although few union workers are directly affected by increases in the minimum wage, 
many empirical studies suggest that skilled or semi-skilled unionized workers are one 
of the prime beneficiaries of the minimum wage law, as the law prevents low-skilled 
workers from offering to work at a wage low enough to make them attractive compared 
to the higher-skilled and higher-priced workers (Burkhauser, Couch & Wittenburg, 
2000; Card & Krueger, 1997; Welch, 1974).
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B.  Why Make Employee Rights Mandatory?
It is not the purpose of this chapter to critique or assess the rationales described above 
for employment rights. I can assume (but don’t have to assume for my argument) that 
the employment law in question has an appropriate overall social purpose. Whatever 
their reasons for intervening on behalf of employees, policymakers must still implicitly 
or explicitly decide whether to make the rights inalienable, which should turn at least 
in part on whether alienability is consistent with the rationale for the law in the first 
place.
Inalienability of individual employment rights can be defended on a few different 
grounds. First, some laws are enacted not to protect the affected workers but to protect 
others. Thus, the rights are forced on the affected workers regardless of what they indi-
vidually want. The FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions, for example, are sometimes 
explained as an attempt to prevent those workers who are willing to work long hours at 
low wages from undercutting.6 If this is the purpose of the law, it is undercut by allowing 
workers to opt out, because the opting-out, undercutting workers harm the workers we 
want to protect. In a similar vein, suppose workers care about their relative income, not 
just how well off they are individually. In that case, worker A, by agreeing to work in a 
dangerous factory for an extra $10,000, hurts the relative income ranking of worker B. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations mandating safety 
can prevent this prisoner’s dilemma by mandating safe factories. Each worker prefers a 
safe factory to an unsafe factory but only if the others do not sell their safety for higher 
wages. If OSHA regulations were waivable, the rat race would continue (Akerlof, 1976; 
Frank, 1985; McAdams, 1992).
The protection of a workplace public good is another rationale for making employ-
ment rights mandatory. A workplace public good is often underproduced because it is 
inherently non-excludable and nonrival (Samuelson, 1954). When the employer pro-
vides the benefit to one worker, it necessarily provides the benefit to other workers at 
little or no extra cost. For example, workplace safety is generally a public good, in that 
other workers at the same plant benefit at little or no cost once a single worker has, say, 
clean air, adequate lighting, or a safe production-line speed. An employee who initi-
ates an OSHA inspection also benefits other workers from the abatement of the health 
and safety risk, but often bears the cost of initiating the inspection (the wrath of the 
employer) alone. An individual worker may rationally decline to bear the costs of a non-
mandatory public good, hoping that another employee will bear the costs and all will 
benefit. For employment rights that secure public goods, making them waivable would 
reinstate the collective action problem the law sought to address.
A third rationale for making employment rights mandatory emphasizes the limited 
information workers have about the costs and benefits of many workplace goods. 
Individual employees often lack the necessary information to make an informed choice 
on whether to waive an employment right. Sometimes the information rationale for 
mandating rights is strongly paternalistic.7 Policymakers believe misguided workers 
do not know what is in their best interest and so will foolishly waive a protection if 
allowed to do so. Additionally, workers may not understand the legal effect of a waiver 
and believe there is no harm in signing one (Kim, 1995; 1997). In other cases, particu-
larly where employment protections involve technical data (e.g., OSHA health rights) 
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or rights stretching out for decades (e.g., pension rights), the information rationale is 
weakly paternalistic. In these situations, the argument for inalienability is that workers 
cannot process the information or intelligently assess the risks, but if they could, they 
themselves would demand the protection.
Behavioral decision theory provides additional reasons for making employee rights 
inalienable. Workers are often risk optimists, underestimating the dangers of their work 
and overestimating their own ability to avoid hazards. People are particularly bad at 
accurately assessing low-probability events, which characterize many workplace risks 
such as the risk of workplace fatalities or wrongful discharge. Workers are myopic and 
thus have particular difficulty assessing the value of far-off events like retirement pen-
sions (Rachlinski, 2003; Sunstein, 2002; Weiss, 1991).
Perhaps the most common reason for mandating rights is the weak bargaining power 
of individual workers. The fear is that workers would waive an alienable right without 
getting anything in return, making the legislation pointless (Schwab, 1988). For example, 
suppose an employee has accepted a job paying $50,000 with 10 days’ vacation. Now the 
legislature enacts a vacation law that says a worker gets 15 days’ vacation unless he or 
she waives the right. Will the law have any effect? The argument of no effect is that the 
employer will ask, and the employee will agree, to initial a vacation-law waiver and then 
sign the same contract for $50,000 and 10 days’ vacation. People renting automobiles, 
for example, seem to initial waivers all the time without much hesitation or much in 
return for the waiver.
Counter-arguments exist to the view that giving an alienable employment right to 
a worker without bargaining power is giving nothing at all. Perhaps the worker will 
hesitate to initial a waiver, worrying that the statute reflects the approach that suits 
most people.8 Cognitive biases such as anchoring effects, framing effects, and endow-
ment effects mean that initial presumptions in statutes matter. Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein (2009) have argued that policymakers can effectively use default rather than 
mandatory rules to nudge people in a wide range of situations to further “libertarian 
paternalism.” We do not have to resolve the debates here, and can simply conclude that 
in many cases where workers have little bargaining power, a waivable right may not be 
much of a right at all.
Policymakers in such cases are left with a tradeoff in creating an employment right. 
If they are confident workers and the world are better off with their intervention, then 
rights can be made mandatory. But wise policymakers are often less sure of the appropri-
ate outcome, or recognize that policymakers themselves are subject to cognitive biases 
and other limitations that sometimes make their policy prescriptions less than ideal 
(Rachlinski & Farina, 2002). Further, the appropriate outcome for some workers often 
is inappropriate for others, but legislators might have difficulty creating laws tailored to 
individual situations. Indeed, rules (as opposed to standards) by definition apply broadly 
to parties in many situations, not all of whom benefit from the rule. If the over-inclusive-
ness and under-inclusiveness of the rule is too great, policymakers may prefer a presump-
tion, allowing parties to opt out if the policy is not appropriate for their circumstances. 
But as just discussed, allowing opt-outs may undercut the rationale for the employment 
right in the first place, if the right is a public good, or if limited information or cognitive 
biases prevent workers from accurately assessing the value of the right, or if individual 
workers have no bargaining power to get something in exchange for opting out.
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III.  THE UNION AS BROKER
An intermediate solution exists to the dilemma of overly wooden mandates, on the one 
hand, and waiver by powerless individuals with limited information, on the other. That 
solution is to create a right that is mandatory at the individual-worker level but allows 
workers collectively through the union to waive the protection in favor of other benefits.
We identified above five dangers associated with allowing individual workers to waive 
rights: (1) undercutting or rat-race problems; (2) workplace public goods; (3) limited 
information; (4) cognitive biases; and (5) weak bargaining power. Let’s now examine the 
dangers in turn to see if union brokers can overcome them.
The rat race occurs when an individual worker can get ahead of other workers by 
waiving a costly employment benefit such as workplace safety or maximum hours, 
even if each worker prefers the safety or shorter hours as long as others get them also. 
If the rat race occurs within the collective bargaining unit, a union can alleviate it. For 
example, suppose the rat race takes the form of a contest where the most productive 
line worker is promoted to foreman. Each worker takes on more and more hours in 
hopes of a promotion. An hours law limiting the workweek to 40 hours will have no 
effect if individual workers can waive the limitation and work an hour more than other 
workers, thereby setting off a rat race. But what if 40 hours is below the optimal amount 
for a particular worksite, all things considered, even if 40 hours is the optimal number 
for a national law? A union could prevent the local rat race by negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement that calls for 45 hours, which workers locally might prefer to 40 
hours. Without the union, the rat race might escalate to 50 or 60 hours to the detriment 
of workers. Union brokering cannot prevent a rat race when some of the rats in the race 
are beyond the collective bargaining unit. In that case, a mandatory right rather than 
union-broker right is needed to solve the issue.
In a similar vein, union brokering does not undermine workplace public goods in 
the same way that individual waivers do. An individual worker, considering whether to 
exercise or waive a public-good right, may waive the right even when the overall benefits 
to workers exceed costs, hoping to free ride on others who exercise the right. Avoiding 
this problem was the public-goods argument for a mandate. But the role of the union in 
bargaining is to consider the costs and benefits to all workers of exercising or brokering 
the right for something better. By internalizing the benefits to all workers in its calculus, 
it avoids the free-rider issue of workplace public goods.
Inadequate information is also a lesser problem for unions than individual workers, 
because unions have more information at their disposal and thus can make more 
informed decisions. Individual workers have great difficulty knowing about safety 
records, legal rights, and other items critical to deciding between jobs. Unions have 
research departments and are repeat players on many issues, learning from experience. 
Further, the National Labor Relations Act commands employers to bargain in good 
faith, with a subsidiary duty to provide the union with information to substantiate claims 
made during negotiations.9
What about the cognitive limitations that make individual waiver so problematic? 
Can a union avoid making the same kinds of erroneous judgments that their members 
might, given that unions are composed of those very same people? Unions likely have 
a psychological perspective on workplace risk that differs from that of the individual in 
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two ways: First, unions lack the personal investment in avoiding injury that seems to 
give rise to an excess of optimism. Unions thereby can see problems from an outsider’s 
perspective, which can reduce cognitive errors in judgment (Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1995). Second, unions see workplace risk as a repeated issue that comes up in the 
aggregate, not one case at a time. Psychologists have found that looking at problems in 
an aggregate or frequentist perspective (e.g., 10 out of 100) can reduce the influence of 
some kinds of cognitive errors in judgment (Gigerenzer, 1991). Unions have a broader 
perspective on the tradeoffs than do individual workers. Workers operate from the 
inside while unions can step back and take an outsider’s view. In doing so, unions can 
avoid cognitive problems that arise from taking problems one at a time (Rachlinski, 
2000).
Finally, unions have bargaining power and, unlike individual workers, will not be 
coerced into waiving rights without getting something in return. The give and take of 
collective bargaining is far different from the form contracts and shopping among job 
offers that characterize “bargaining” in the individual context. In collective bargaining, 
a presumption favoring the union could strengthen its negotiating posture even if the 
presumption is waivable. With the presumption favoring the union, management must 
raise the issue if it wants change. Speaking first often weakens one’s bargaining position. 
The idea is that unions will broker rights while individual workers waive rights. Unions 
will keep the rights that workers value most highly and trade less-valued rights for 
other benefits, while individual workers might receive nothing in return for their waiver 
(Schwab, 1987).
In sum, unions are often in a better position relative to individuals when it comes to 
brokering employment rights. Unions can prevent local rat races and promote local 
public goods, have more resources to gather and disseminate relevant information, are 
not subject to the full array of cognitive biases to which individuals are prone, and have 
superior bargaining power.
IV.  EXISTING EXAMPLES OF UNION BROKER OF WORKER
RIGHTS
In contrast to the harsh attitude employment law takes toward individual workers 
waiving rights, the law often allows unions to broker rights of their members. Union 
waiver of rights is simply not as suspect as waiver by individual workers. This power for 
unions to waive rights gives unions a potential role as broker of employment-law rights.
This section outlines the various ways that current law allows unions to broker rights 
on behalf of members. The section’s overall purpose is to show that “union as broker” 
is a current role of unions and not a wild-eyed dream. The section has two parts. First, I 
review the principles underlying union waiver of labor-law rights, to set the stage with a 
union brokering role that is familiar to the labor-law community. Second, I examine the 
current role of unions in brokering employment-law claims. This has two parts: first I 
review § 301 preemption of unionized workers’ employment-law claims. Then I scan the 
broad array of employment laws in which unions currently can act as brokers – ranging 
from ERISA and FLSA to state wage law.
Previous commentators have extensively analyzed union waiver of labor law rights, as 
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distinct from employment rights – that is, the waiver of rights of workers to form unions, 
strike, and bargain collectively or to refrain from doing so (Brosseau, 1980; Harper, 
1981a; 1981b; Westman, 1974). More recently, commentators have analyzed § 301 pre-
emption, whereby workers with rights under a collective bargaining agreement enforce-
able under federal law may be preempted from bringing similar claims under state law. 
Largely uncharted in the academic literature is the degree to which employment rights 
by their own terms apply differently to unionized workers (early efforts include Schwab, 
1989; Estreicher, 1996).
A.  Union Waiver of Labor-Law Rights
A prime purpose behind the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 was to 
increase the bargaining power of workers through collective action. Individual workers, 
it was thought, had no strength to resist employer demands and would be coerced into 
relinquishing, in the name of freedom of contract, any putative rights the law might give 
them. As Senator Wagner, chief sponsor of the Wagner Act, put it:
We are forced to recognize the futility of pretending that there is equality of freedom when a 
single workman, with only his job between his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of 
employment with a representative of a tremendous organization having thousands of workers 
at its call. Thus the right to bargain collectively . . . is a veritable charter of freedom of contract; 
without it there would be slavery by contract.10
In the early days of the NLRA, the Board and courts made clear that individual 
workers could not waive certain basic rights the Act gave them (Phillips, 1986). Thus 
the infamous “yellow dog” contracts – whereby individual workers promised never to 
exercise their right to join a union – were held to be unenforceable; even to propose such 
a contract was an unfair labor practice.11 Individual contracts regulating how workers 
would select a union have likewise been held void because they differed from the Act’s 
procedures.12 Nor can individual workers (or the union) waive their § 8(a)(4) right to file 
charges before the Board without retaliation.13
In contrast to the prohibition against individual workers contracting away their labor-
law rights, the NLRA readily countenances waiver of some Section 7 rights by unions. 
The preferred status of unions in waiving rights was emphasized in NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. (1967). The issue was whether a union-imposed fine on members 
who crossed the picket line during a lawful economic strike violated individual members’ 
§ 7 rights not to assist unions. The Court ruled the union did not violate its members’
rights. In the Supreme Court’s words, the Act “extinguishes the individual employee’s
power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the
chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees.” Justice Black, dissenting,
bemoaned that allowing union waiver means that “by joining a union an employee gives
up or waives some of his § 7 rights.”
Unions routinely bargain away labor-law rights of their members, both when nego-
tiating contracts and processing individual grievances.14 Indeed, unions regularly treat 
rights that are central to labor law as bargaining chips to be traded for employer conces-
sions on other issues.15 The clearest example is the typical no-strike clause in a collective 
bargaining contract. At the heart of the National Labor Relations Act is its protection 
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of the right of workers to strike. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes firing workers for 
striking an unfair labor practice and § 13 specifically declares that “nothing in this act 
shall be construed as to diminish in any way the right to strike” (29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988)). 
Nonetheless, unions commonly waive the right of their members to strike,16 sometimes 
even waiving the right to strike in protest against employer unfair labor practices.17 We 
think nothing of this waiver; indeed, much of federal labor law is designed to encourage 
unions to waive the right to strike.18
Besides the right to strike, unions routinely waive other labor-law rights. Most 
important is the very right to bargain collectively. The mere existence of a certified 
union denies workers the right to bargain collectively with their employer in any other 
group, without any formal waiver of bargaining rights. An employer that bargains 
with any other group commits an unfair labor practice.19 Further, a union often waives 
its own right to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement through 
express “zipper” clauses or “management rights” clauses, through bargaining history, or 
through inaction.20
A more esoteric waiver of rights occurs when unions waive their members’ Weingarten 
rights. In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. (1975), the Supreme Court held that the NLRA 
granted employees the right to have a union representative present during interrogations 
they reasonably believe may result in discipline. After some confusion, it is now clear 
that a union can waive this right in a collective bargaining agreement.21 The Board has 
flip-flopped on a parallel right for nonunion workers to have a coworker present at a 
disciplinary interview, although the current rule gives no Weingarten right to nonunion 
workers (Higgins, 2006, pp. 225–35). All indications are that nonunion workers cannot 
waive whatever Weingarten rights they have under prevailing Board law. In the eras 
when all workers have the right, it is an example where unions can waive a right that 
nonunion employees cannot waive. An employer who feels strongly about conducting 
disciplinary interviews in private would be better off, all else equal, with a unionized 
workforce that could put such a waiver into a collective bargaining contract. If the union 
were a good broker who got more value in return for the waiver, employees would be 
better off as well.
In addition to bargaining away rights during contract negotiations, unions frequently 
waive rights when processing grievances or settling unfair labor practice charges. Courts 
sometimes acknowledge openly that they tolerate union settlements more readily than 
when individual workers settle cases. For example, in Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers 
v. NLRB (1986), a union filed unfair labor practice charges on behalf of workers who
were permanently replaced when they stopped work to protest unsafe working condi-
tions. The NLRB eventually approved settlements between the employer and individual
employees whereby the employees received small cash payments but waived all legal
claims, including any right to reinstatement. Upon the union’s petition for review, the
court of appeals reversed the Board’s approval of individual settlements. In an opinion
by Judge Harry Edwards, a former labor law professor, the court recognized that the
Board often encourages settlements between a union and the employer as furthering the
collective bargaining and arbitration process. No such collective policy was furthered,
however, when an individual employer settled unfair labor practice complaints with indi-
vidual workers. The court remanded for further reasons why the Board should approve
individual settlements.
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Not all labor-law rights are waivable by unions. Unions cannot waive the rights of 
members freely to discuss and choose their representative. At a basic level, this means 
sensibly that a union cannot lock itself in as representative by waiving the right of 
workers to vote for another or no union. But the employees’ right to choose their repre-
sentative is broader than just the right to vote; for example, the union normally cannot 
validly waive the rights of members to distribute union literature at work (NLRB v. 
Magnavox, 1974). Nor can a union waive statutory rights that benefit third parties, such 
as the Act’s prohibitions on hot-cargo agreements and secondary boycotts, on closed 
shops, and on hiring halls that favor union members.22
It is hard to articulate an overarching principle governing when a union can waive 
labor-law rights (Brousseau, 1980; Harper, 1981a; 1981b). Whatever the specific line 
between waivable and inalienable NLRA rights, three lessons are clear. First, labor 
policy encourages unions to waive rights, even “fundamental” rights like the right to 
strike. Second, the basic reason for accepting union waiver is that unions have the bar-
gaining power that individual workers lack. Third, labor policy becomes skittish about 
union waiver when the union waives rights important for the democratic nature of the 
union, particularly the right of dissidents to challenge union leadership.
Unions can fairly portray their power to waive labor-law rights as a “win-win” situa-
tion for the unionized workplace. The average worker benefits from waiver because the 
union will not broker rights without receiving something preferable in return. Employers 
benefit because they can escape certain costly restraints or conditions. The mere exis-
tence of a union prevents bargaining with splinter groups of workers, and channels and 
filters worker demands and complaints. By contract, the union can waive other labor-
law rights, the most important being the right to strike, the right to bargain continuously 
over mandatory subjects, and the right to route unfair labor practice complaints to the 
Board rather than through private arbitration. Overall, union waiver of labor rights is 
commonplace and beneficial to workers, assuming the union adequately represents the 
interests of its members.23
B.  Union as Broker of Employment-Law Rights
As outlined earlier, workers have a panoply of employment rights under federal and 
state statutes and the common law. This section surveys this panoply to illustrate where 
unions have a role in brokering rights, usually by negotiating language in a collective 
bargaining agreement that alters what would otherwise be the employment rights of 
covered workers.
1. Section 301 preemption of unionized workers’ employment rights
A collective bargaining agreement regulates many aspects of the employer-employee
relationship, and typically creates a grievance-arbitration procedure to resolve disputes
about this regulation. This regulation often overlaps with statutory or common-law
employment rights of workers. For example, suppose a collective bargaining agreement
creates disability insurance for injured workers, complete with a union-management
panel to resolve disputes. A worker upset with erratic disability payments wants to bring
a tort action complete with punitive damages alleging bad-faith handling of his insur-
ance claim. May the worker sue in tort, or is his sole avenue the grievance-arbitration
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procedure established by the collective bargaining procedure? These are the facts of 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), and a unanimous Supreme Court held that the tort 
claim was preempted.
The rationale for preemption comes from § 301(a) of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act (LMRA), which gives the federal courts jurisdiction to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements (29 U.S.C. § 1985(a) (1988)). The Supreme Court had earlier 
held that the LMRA requires a uniform body of federal common law to govern § 301 
cases (Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 1957). State-law claims that might upset 
the uniformity of interpreting collective bargaining agreements must be preempted. In 
Lueck, the Court required preemption of state claims where “resolution of the state-law 
claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining 
agreement]” (id. at 220).
Section 301 does not preempt all state claims with fact patterns amenable to grievance 
arbitration, as the Supreme Court made clear in Lingle v. Norge Division (1988). Lingle, 
working under a collective bargaining contract that protected her against being fired 
without just cause, was fired after she filed a workers’ compensation claim. The union 
filed a grievance on her behalf, and ultimately the arbitrator ordered reinstatement with 
back pay. Meanwhile, Lingle filed a tort suit in Illinois state court for retaliatory dis-
charge.24 The Supreme Court held that § 301 did not preempt the tort claim even though 
the state court must analyze the same facts as the arbitrator. Rather, the issue is whether 
the state claim is “independent” of the collective bargaining agreement in that it “can be 
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself.”
The employee in Lingle had argued a more expansive theory of non-preemption that, 
if accepted, would have eliminated differential treatment of employment claims by union 
workers in most cases. The employee had emphasized that, under Illinois law, the right 
to be free from retaliatory discharge is nonnegotiable and applies to union and nonunion 
workers alike. The employee argued that nonnegotiability by individuals should by itself 
mean that the state right could not be preempted by a collective bargaining contract. 
The Court rejected this analysis, however, declaring that neither nonnegotiable rights 
nor rights given to all state workers would ensure non-preemption. Further, the Court 
emphasized that union waiver of individual, non-preempted state law rights was a sepa-
rate issue from § 301 preemption and left open the possibility of such union waiver if it 
were “clear and unmistakable.”
Whether unions could waive state-law rights was touched on in a later Supreme 
Court case on § 301 preemption, Livadas v. Bradshaw (1994). When Livadas, a union-
ized worker, was fired, she demanded to be immediately paid the wages owed her, as 
guaranteed to all California workers by state law. Her store manager refused to pay 
immediately, however, saying company policy required that the last paycheck be mailed 
from the central office. Livadas complained to the California Labor Commissioner but 
the agency refused to process her complaint because she was covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause. She sued the Labor Commissioner, 
complaining that this policy against pursuing state-law claims of unionized workers 
was preempted as interfering with the federal right to bargain collectively. The Labor 
Commissioner defended by arguing that state processing of wage claims based on a col-
lective bargaining agreement would itself be preempted by § 301. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the employee and held that the Commissioner could not refuse to vindicate 
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unionized workers’ state-law claim to prompt payment of wages simply because they 
worked under a collective bargaining agreement.
Most importantly for us, however, the Supreme Court made clear that state stat-
utes creating employment rights could have opt-out provisions for unionized workers 
(“These ‘opt-out’ statutes are thus manifestly different in their operation (and their effect 
on federal rights) from the Commission’s rule that an employee forfeits his state-law 
rights the moment a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause is entered 
into.” Id. at 131–2). Several amici had emphasized the broad array of state and federal 
laws that allow unions to waive protection for their members. The Court recognized 
the validity of opt-out statutes but distinguished them from the Livadas statute, which 
covered all employees without regard to union status, and noted there was no indication 
the union purported to bargain away the protections of the state statute merely by creat-
ing a grievance-arbitration procedure. Merely having a collective bargaining agreement 
with an arbitration procedure is insufficient to infer a waiver. We discuss these opt-out 
statutes in the next section.
The AFL-CIO argued for this distinction between state laws that allow unions to 
opt out and state laws that mandate a right only for nonunion workers. In the Livadas 
case, the AFL-CIO amicus brief urged a narrow holding, cautioning that “courts have 
just begun to consider preemption challenges raised in relation to state minimum stan-
dard laws that distinguish between unionized and nonunionized workplaces.” Still, the 
AFL-CIO suggested support for a “nuanced” state law that allowed unionized workers 
to opt out if they bargained for “similar but not necessarily identical protections,” 
because such an opt-out law “facilitates collective bargaining rather than punishes its 
exercise,” even though it argued for preemption of the California policy that processed 
wage-payment claims only of nonunionized workers.
Since the Supreme Court decisions in Lueck and Livadas, lower courts have preempted 
dozens of state-law claims by unionized employees under § 301 while recognizing others, 
depending on whether the claim would require interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing contract (see Higgins, 2006).25 The line is not simply between tort and contract or 
between negotiable and nonnegotiable state-law rights, although both those lines have 
been articulated in the cases. Section 301 preempts most common-law claims with a con-
tractual foundation, even if they sound in tort, including breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, fraud and misrepresentation, tortious interference with contrac-
tual relations, and mishandling of health insurance or medical leave. They also include 
many privacy claims including improper drug testing (see Kim, 2006), which typically 
claim the employer created and then violated zones of privacy and thereby require inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining contract and workplace norms it created. But the 
range of preempted claims is vast, ranging from wrongful discharge to misappropriation 
of trade secrets.26
Some courts have gone a long way toward preempting state-law claims based on 
general or boilerplate language. In Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. (1988), for example, 
a unionized employee was terminated after failing an employer drug test. He sued in state 
court for violation of the state constitutional right to privacy and a state privacy statute. 
The First Circuit held that § 301 preempted the state-law claims. The collective bargain-
ing agreement had a general clause giving management the right “to post reasonable 
rules and regulations from time to time.” Because this clause might give the employer 
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the right to institute a drug test, the court would have to interpret the collective bargain-
ing agreement in judging the state-law claim, something that § 301 forbids. Other courts 
require more specific language to trigger preemption.
Unions can use § 301 preemption to broker rights. By agreeing to specific language 
in the collective bargaining agreement that addresses state-law rights, presumably in 
return for worker benefits elsewhere in the agreement, the union shields the employer 
from a bevy of state-law claims. But § 301 preemption is an unpredictable blunderbuss, 
difficult to aim and uncertain in result. In particular, preemption based on the mere 
existence of a collective bargaining agreement is dangerous for unions and for workers, 
because it is unlikely the union received anything in return for the elimination of a 
state right. If the very existence of a collective bargaining agreement deprives workers 
of rights that nonunion workers enjoy, that is hardly a selling point for unions. This is 
why the AFL-CIO argued in Livadas for preemption of state laws that give rights to 
nonunion but not union workers, while arguing for the legitimacy of opt-out statutes 
whereby all workers have the state-law right unless language in the collective agreement 
alters the right.
C.  Employment Statutes with Collective Bargaining Opt-Outs
If § 301 preemption is a blunderbuss with unpredictable net benefits for unionized 
workers, opt-out statutes can be an effective tool with win-win benefits for workers 
and employers. Many employment laws, both federal and state, by their express terms 
apply differently to unionized workforces. Others allow unions to opt out or alter 
the general protections given workers. This section cannot catalogue all the state and 
federal employment laws with this feature. Rather, the goal here is to highlight impor-
tant opportunities for union brokering and also to describe a few esoteric laws to give 
a sense of the dazzling variety of employment laws where union brokering can occur. 
The unifying theme in these union-waiver provisions is the legislative belief that union-
ized workforces do not need the full array of mandatory protections afforded weaker, 
nonunion workers.
State laws  A slew of state laws create employment rights that allow unions to opt 
out of the claims. Section I described the California law that mandates eight-hour 
work shifts for miners but allows a collective bargaining agreement to agree to shifts 
as long as 12 hours. Such opt-outs are a common feature in state statutes regulating 
wage payments, maximum hours, overtime, meal and rest requirements, and the like.27 
For example, in Vermont, employers must pay weekly wages within six days, but if 
a collective bargaining agreement calls for it, the paycheck can relate back 13 days.28 
Oregon mandates that employers immediately pay a terminated employee all earned 
wages unless a collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise.29 Nevada mandates 
overtime pay after eight hours per day or 40 hours per week unless a collective bargain-
ing contract says otherwise.30 Illinois mandates a 20-minute meal break after five hours 
of work in a seven-and-a-half hour day unless different meal periods are established by 
a collective bargaining agreement.31 Collective bargaining agreements can alter state 
law requirements regulating health insurance and personnel files.32 In Montana, col-
lective bargaining agreements can opt out of mandatory health and safety devices.33 In 
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Arkansas, a collective  bargaining agreement is not bound by the minimum-wage provi-
sions of state law.34
ERISA  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 is a complex 
statute regulating employer- and union-provided pension and other benefit plans (29 
U.S.C. §§ 1001–461). One goal of ERISA is to encourage employers to extend benefits 
beyond top employees to contingent or lower-paid workers. The pension vesting require-
ments are a major way that ERISA attempts to protect workers who do not spend a 
career with a single employer.35 ERISA requires that pension benefits completely vest 
(i.e., become non-forfeitable) after five years of service.36 Compared to the lengthy 
requirements typical before ERISA, five-year vesting ensures that transient workers can 
accrue pension benefits.
Some unionized workers, however, are subject to less protective ten-year vesting 
requirements. In a provision added in 1986,37 ERISA allows a multiemployer plan 
established by one or more collective bargaining agreements to have ten-year cliff 
vesting,38 meaning that a worker can be required to wait ten years before earning any 
non-forfeitable pension benefits. This late-vesting exception for unionized workers is an 
important example of the brokering potential for unions. Apparently, both management 
and labor saw the provision as a potential weapon for unions when the exception was 
debated in Congress. Ironically, but consistent with the thesis that unions can benefit 
from brokering opportunities, unions pushed for lesser vesting protection for their 
members, while management feared giving unions this waiver opportunity.39 Congress 
apparently bought the union argument that unionized employees did not need the rapid 
vesting schedule because they could take care of themselves through collective bargain-
ing. Business interests opposed the relaxed vesting standards for multiemployer union 
plans because it would give unionized firms a competitive edge.40 These anti-union ana-
lysts recognized that unions could benefit their firms – and thus “skew” decision-making 
on whether management should oppose unions – by brokering short-vesting rights that 
are onerous to management and not particularly useful to their members. In short, these 
anti-union analysts feared empowering the “union as broker” by allowing more lax 
 regulation of unionized firms.
ERISA also gives lesser protection to unionized workers in its nondiscrimination 
requirements. The nondiscrimination requirements, which are perhaps the most techni-
cal sections in a technical statute, are designed to encourage employers to spread pension 
benefits to lower-paid workers. If the employer wants its pension and benefits plans to 
receive the tax breaks that ERISA gives a “qualified” plan41 (and all employers want 
this), it must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.42 For example 
(and simplifying grossly), wage earners cannot receive lower pension benefits in percent-
age terms than high-paid salaried workers. ERISA excludes from the discrimination 
analysis “employees who are included in a unit of employees covered by an agreement 
which the Secretary of Labor finds to be a collective bargaining agreement between 
employee representatives and one or more employers, if there is evidence that retirement 
benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining . . .” (26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(3)(A)). Thus, 
unions can waive the right of its wage-earning members to receive as generous a pension 
as highly compensated officials of the company.43
Congress enacted this provision for two primary reasons: to allow employees 
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represented by unions to pursue other (presumably more desirable) forms of compensa-
tion as an alternative to mandated pension benefits, and to make it more likely that non-
union employees will benefit from membership in a qualified plan.44 Unionized workers 
are sufficiently protected, under ERISA policy, by the procedural requirement that the 
union consciously bargain about retirement benefits.
Another ERISA provision, added in the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), prohibits employers from initiating certain 
pension plan terminations where the action would violate the terms of an existing bar-
gaining agreement (29 U.S.C. § 1341).45 This might seem to discourage employers from 
dealing with a collective bargaining representative, but the legislative history indicates 
that the provision exists merely to codify prior court cases in which union contracts were 
construed as denying the employer the right to terminate unilaterally.46
FLSA  The Fair Labor Standards Act also allows unions to waive rights that are man-
datory for nonunion workers. The Act prohibits employers from imposing a workweek 
longer than 40 hours unless hours in excess of 40 hours are compensated at “one and 
one-half times the regular rate” (29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988)). However, the Act allows 
special workweek arrangements where collective bargaining agreements are involved. 
Employers need not pay time-and-a-half where union contracts provide for no more 
than 1,040 hours of work during a 26-week period,47 or under certain circumstances 
where union workers are required to work no more than 2,240 hours during a period of 
52 weeks.48
Congress apparently enacted the special workweek provisions for union-negotiated 
contracts to allow more flexible scheduling for industries such as mining and timber, 
which found it more efficient to employ workers for longer hours over discrete periods 
of time because of the remote location of their operations.49 However, evidence of actual 
inclusion of such provisions in collective bargaining agreements is sparse indeed,50 and 
early decisions showed that courts would give the special provision a narrow scope (see 
Cabunac v. National Terminals Corp., 1944).
The Walsh-Healey Act provides another example of union waiver of overtime provi-
sions (41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq.). The Walsh-Healey Act sets employment standards for 
federal contracts exceeding $10,000. The Act limits the workweek of employees of these 
contractors to 40 hours (41 U.S.C. § 35(b)). However, the section also cross-references 
the union-waiver provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, thereby allowing longer 
workweeks as long as the employees do not exceed the maximum number of hours under 
FLSA for 26 weeks or 52 weeks (41 U.S.C. § 35(b)).
WARN Act  The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act 
requires employers to give 60 days’ advance notice before a mass layoff or plant closure. 
The warning procedure is technical and generally requires that the employer individually 
notify in writing every employee that might be affected (29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1)). If the 
employees are represented by a union, however, written notice to the union is sufficient 
(29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(1)). Thus, a unionized employer can give WARN Act notice to 
workers for the cost of a stamp, while nonunion employers must go through the greater 
administrative expense of individual notification.
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V.  ASSESSING THE UNION AS BROKER OF EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS
Let’s get out of the weeds of individual examples and survey the swamp.
A.  Do Unions Want the Brokering Role?
Whether unions want a brokering role for employment rights is ultimately a question of 
bargaining power. If the union has sufficient bargaining power, it can decline to waive 
a valuable right but agree to negotiate over rights of less value. This power to negoti-
ate should make its members better off. This chapter has documented instances where 
unions have embraced the brokering role, such as in the eight- versus 12-hour miners’ day 
discussed in Section I. Overall, the chapter suggests that it would be in unions’ interest 
to seriously consider the brokering role when lobbying over other employment statutes.
Still, unions often hesitate to take on this brokering role. For example, in the second 
example in Section I, we noted that the union in 14 Penn Plaza argued against the bro-
kering role that the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed – by which a collective bargain-
ing agreement could force workers’ statutory discrimination claims into arbitration and 
waive their right to go to court. Why would unions want to eliminate the possibility of 
trading rights? Under the perspective of this chapter, this is like asking when unions 
might willingly bind themselves to the mast like Odysseus.
One reason for unions rejecting the brokering role is that it may be complicated to 
justify a waiver to the membership. In the course of lengthy negotiations, it may be dif-
ficult to point to or quantify what was received in return for the waiver. For example, the 
union may have waived the right to an eight-hour day, but what did it get in exchange? 
Indeed, dissatisfied members who think the union sold them out might bring a lawsuit 
claiming a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, a costly and embarrassing 
lawsuit for a union to defend.
More generally, the value of the brokering role comes in finding win-win bargaining 
solutions with the employer. This requires flexibility, trust, and compromise. A union 
can easily be tarred as being conciliatory or even a company-controlled union if it con-
cedes a right without a clear quid pro quo. Additionally, flexibility sometimes reduces 
bargaining strength. If the union burns its bridges, management knows the union cannot 
concede and so management may be more conciliatory. Unions attempt such postures 
today, with  rallying cries such as “No backward steps.” By the same token, unions may 
be in a stronger bargaining position overall if they can simply keep certain issues off the 
table as being inalienable. This is especially true when workers clearly value the right 
more than it costs employers. It may complicate bargaining with no payoff to the union 
to make a right formally waivable where members would never be better off from a 
waiver.
This suggests that unions should want a statute-by-statute approach to waivers. When 
a right is clearly worth more to workers than it costs employers, there is little to gain 
from bargaining, and the union should not want the statute to permit union brokering. 
But when it is less clear that workers value the right so highly, or the right clearly costs 
management a great deal to provide, the union may gain if the statute permits a broker-
ing role.
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B.  Does Society Want the Union as Broker?
Even when the union benefits from a brokering role, is it good public policy to allow 
unions to opt out of employment rights? This question has no single answer. First, if 
unions cannot be expected to faithfully represent their members, the legislature should 
balk at allowing unions to waive their members’ rights. Whether and when the interests 
of union leaders and members are aligned is a big issue, worthy of a separate inquiry 
(Schwab, 1992). Second, even if the union democratically reflects the interests of its 
median member, some statutes are designed to protect the rights of individual or minor-
ity workers against majority control. The antidiscrimination laws immediately come to 
mind. It would be folly to allow a collective bargaining contract to waive the protection 
of Title VII for its members. Even if unions represent the majority, that majority might 
well agree with the employer to sell out the minority. Thus, public policy calls for some 
rights to be inalienable to union brokering. Some would argue that allowing unions to 
agree to arbitration of discrimination claims is in this category.
Laws enacted to protect third parties outside the workplace should also be immune 
from union brokering. Thus, a union’s waiver of the right of its employees to sue for 
violation of public policies extending beyond the workplace would harm society at 
large. Common-law protections guard against discharge for the refusal to commit an 
unlawful act, fulfilling a public obligation, or whistleblowing. In Nees v. Hocks (1975), 
for example, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized the wrongful-discharge claim of an 
employee fired for being absent because of jury service, reasoning that the public policy 
of protecting the jury system outweighed the employer’s private interest. A union waiver 
of the right against discharge because of jury service (which it is a little hard to imagine 
that a union would do) would likewise thwart the will of the community and harm the 
jury system, and so the waiver should not be given force. A similar rationale would 
prevent unions from waiving whistleblower rights of its members arising from statute 
or the common law. Employees are often in unique positions to know of illegal activity 
within their firm – for example, the illegal dumping of toxic wastes. Such illegal acts do 
not merely affect the one whistleblower, or even just the firm; they harm third parties or 
the public at large. As unions are the exclusive representatives of their bargaining unit, 
and not society, laws protecting third parties should not be subject to brokering.
On the other hand, many employment rights solve public-goods problems in the 
workplace as distinct from the larger society. The paradigmatic example here is work-
place safety standards, where providing a safe speed for one worker on the assembly line 
provides it for all. We discussed earlier that a union can alleviate the underproduction 
of workplace public goods within its brokering role. Safety laws that allow unions to 
negotiate or opt out of otherwise mandatory standards are therefore consistent with 
good public policy.
Union brokering is good public policy for many other employment rights. As outlined 
earlier, union waiver does not suffer from problems that make individual waiver so 
problematic. One problem was the unequal bargaining power of the individual worker. 
Unions can provide that equality. Other problems were the lack of information and 
expertise and the cognitive biases that individual workers have in processing information 
on many issues. Unions, with their research staffs and institutional memory, can provide 
that information and expertise.
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CONCLUSION
Most employment laws create rights for workers that are inalienable. This chapter has 
argued that, in certain contexts, it may be beneficial to unions, employees, and employ-
ers to allow unions to broker or opt out of rights that are inalienable for an individual 
employee. Most employment rights are mandatory for individual workers, whether to 
solve rat races or public goods in the workplace or to protect against information defi-
cits, cognitive biases, or lack of bargaining power. The union as a collective body is less 
susceptible to the particular weaknesses of the individual – a union has the power and 
resources to broker a right in favor of employees into even greater value for the workers 
it represents, the employer it bargains with, and society as a whole. In short, unions can 
provide the nuance in regulation necessary for an efficient market, while still protecting 
the interests of workers, employers, and society at large.
Union brokering should be subject to strictures. First, legislatures should require a 
clear and unequivocal waiver of a specific entitlement, to prevent a far-reaching interpre-
tation of general contract language. Second, union brokering should be proscribed when 
laws are meant to protect third parties (that is, parties who are not represented during 
collective bargaining) or meant to protect minority interests not well represented by the 
union.
The critical question is whether important aspects of workplace policy are best decided 
centrally in Washington or Sacramento, through contract between individual worker 
and employer, or through collective bargaining between union and employer. A long 
tradition suggests that this intermediate level of inquiry, collective bargaining, is optimal 
on many issues. The union as broker is a modern adaptation to that long-time message.
NOTES
1. Cal. Lab. Code § 750 (West 2009).
2. Cal. Lab. Code § 750.5 (West 2009) states: “The provisions of Section 750 shall not prohibit a period of
employment up to 12 hours within a 24-hour period when the employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees of the employer have entered into a valid collective bargaining agreement where the
agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees.”
In 1995, the California legislature again amended the statute to allow an additional exception “when a
2/3 majority of the employees who work for a particular employer vote, in an election conducted at the
expense of the employer pursuant to prescribed procedures, to adopt a policy that authorizes a regular
workday of more than eight hours in a 24-hour period.” Cal. Lab. Code § 750(b) (West 2009).
3. Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1995), reversing Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 858
F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
4. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (reversing Penn Plaza); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (reversing Gilmer and Circuit City).
5. Franken Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118 §
8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55 (2010).
6. See Mechmet v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 825 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The first purpose was
to prevent workers willing (maybe out of desperation . . .) to work abnormally long hours from taking
jobs away from workers who prefer to work shorter hours. . . . The second purpose was to spread work
and thereby reduce unemployment, by requiring the employer to pay a penalty for using fewer workers
for the same amount of work as would be necessary if each worker worked a shorter week.”).
7. For a discussion of strong and weak paternalism, see Sunstein (2006, p. 249) (describing responses to cog-
nitive error as consisting either of “weak paternalism, through debiasing and other strategies that leave
people free to choose as they wish . . . [or] strong paternalism, which forecloses choice”).
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8. Schwab (1988, p. 260) describes a “hesitation effect” of contract presumptions:
Parties are often uncertain which clause will suit them best, particularly when the clause deals with
remote contingencies. The parties may believe that contract presumptions reflect the standard, widely 
accepted solution to a contracting situation. . . . A nominal beneficiary, then, aware of his uncertainty 
about the value of various clauses, must be induced to take the risk that waiving the standard clause 
is in his interest. For this reason, beneficiaries will demand more when waiving an entitlement than 
they would pay to purchase the entitlement. If so, we should see that contract presumptions distribute 
wealth toward the beneficiary. These explanations would suggest that parties in general hesitate (that 
is, demand extra compensation) to waive presumptions. Let me term this the “general hesitation effect” 
of contract presumptions.
9. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that employer violated its section 8(a)(5) duty 
to bargain in good faith when it refused to give union financial information backing its claim it could not 
afford a 10 cent per hour wage increase).
10. 78 Cong. Rec. 3679 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the National Labor Relations
Act, 1935, at 20.
11. Atlas Bag & Burlap Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 292 (1936) (yellow-dog contracts interfere with § 7 right to organize); 
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 10 N.L.R.B. 288, 306 (1938) (yellow-dog contracts are “invalid and of 
no effect”).
12. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159, 178 (1937) (“the Board’s power is an exclusive one and not in any way 
dependent upon, or affected by . . . agreements between private parties”).
13. Ingram Mfg. Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 908 (1938).
14. See International News Service Div., 113 N.L.R.B. 1067, 1070 (1955) (“The Board has said repeatedly
that statutory rights may be waived by collective bargaining.”); American Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
722 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“It is well settled that a union may lawfully waive statutory rights of
represented employees in a collective bargaining agreement.”).
15. A student commentator aptly summarized the waiver doctrine, “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the 
[NLRA] in such a way as to make inviolable only a limited few of the rights granted therein. . . . Other
rights are not, in this sense, treated as ‘rights,’ but rather as ‘bargaining chips,’ which have been granted
to labor upon its being organized, and which may (and in the Court’s view were intended to be) bargained 
away in exchange for employer ‘concessions’ during contract negotiations.” Note (1986, p. 846; emphasis 
in original).
16. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79–80 (1953) (upholding discharge of union
member who engaged in sympathy strike in violation of no-strike clause); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas
Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (right to strike implicitly waived by arbitration clause in collective bargaining
agreement); Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (rejecting union’s argument that right
to strike may not be waived where employer had imposed sanctions on union leaders after a sympathy
strike, but finding no valid waiver because the general no-strike clause in the contract did not indicate
“clear and unmistakable” waiver); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 803 v. NLRB, 
826 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the right to engage in a sympathy strike was waived by a
general no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement).
17. See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 727–8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that
unfair labor practice strikes are waivable, since “merely bargaining away the right to strike does not
impermissibly infringe the ‘full freedom of association’ ”).
18. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (“Congress [in enacting the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947] was also interested in promoting collective bargaining that ended
with agreements not to strike”).
19. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (affirming
that once an exclusive bargaining representative is designated, attempts to compel separate bargaining
are not protected by § 7 of the NLRA).
20. See Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Internal Revenue Service, 838 F.2d 567, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
see generally Higgins (2006, at pp. 1006–07).
21. Prudential Insurance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 208 (1985) (“the Weingarten right, like the right to strike, is
subject to being waived by the union”); see generally Craver (1977).
22. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Edwards, J.).
23. Whether unions appropriately represent the interests of their members is itself a huge question, usually
discussed under the topic of union democracy. I wrote an article on the subject some years back, initially 
conceived as a predicate to the current chapter. Schwab (1992).
24. Illinois was a leader in creating this type of tort of wrongful discharge against public policy – firing an
employee for exercising a statutory right. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978).
25. “Since Allis-Chalmers, lower courts applying the standard in that case have held that Section 301
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preempts claims for fraud and misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, defamation, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, negligence, tortious drug testing, tortious interference with contract, violation of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, violation of worker compensation law, race 
and sex discrimination under state law, breach of a trust agreement, breach of contract, violation of state 
wage and hour laws, and retaliation under state workers compensation and other laws,” citing some 53 
preempted cases and 22 contrary, non-preempted cases. Higgins (2006, pp. 2389–93).
26. Byrd v. VOCA Corp., 962 A.2d 927 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008) (preempting wrongful discharge claim of
employee fired for reporting health and safety violations, because assessing the validity of the discharge
would require interpretation of the management-rights and just-cause clauses in the collective bargaining 
contract); Frederick v. Federal-Mogul, Inc., 185 LRRM 3172 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (preempting employee’s 
claim that employer misappropriated his invention for improved manufacturing process, because claim
required interpretation of job duties specified in collective bargaining agreement).
27. See Brief for Employers Group as Amici Curiae at B1-B6, Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)
(listing 22 state laws with opt-out provisions for collective bargaining agreements).
28. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 342(b).
29. Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.140.
30. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 608.018(2)(f).
31. Ch. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 140/3.
32. Md. Code Ann. art. 48A, § 490L (employer-provided health insurance can not charge different copay-
ments for mail-order pharmacies, unless insurance policy is issued pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 48.44.310 & 48.44.340 (group health insurance policies shall offer cover-
age for chiropractic care and mental health care on same basis as any other care, unless collective bargain-
ing agreement says otherwise); Alaska Stat. § 23.10.430(b) (employees have right to inspect personnel
file, but this requirement does not supersede the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); ch. 820 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. § 40/2 (employees have right to inspect personnel records twice a year, unless otherwise pro-
vided in a CBA); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 103.13(2) (same).
33. Mont. Code Ann. § 50-71-201.
34. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-4-205.
35. Congress intended the vesting requirements “to broaden the number of employees who are eligible to
participate in their employer’s pension plan,” and “to reduce the loss of pension rights by employees who 
terminate their employment prior to retirement age.” 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5,177, 5,178 (statement of Sen. 
Williams regarding conference report on ERISA). When Congress shortened the vesting period in 1986,
the Senate Report explained that “present law does not meet the needs of many workers who change jobs 
frequently. In particular, women and minorities are disadvantaged by the present rules because they tend 
to be more mobile and thus more likely to terminate employment before vesting . . . . [M]ore rapid vesting 
would enhance the retirement income security of low- and middle-income employees.” S. Rep. No. 313,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 589–91 (1973) (Finance Committee report regarding Tax Reform Act of 1986).
36. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A). The five-year requirement is cliff vesting, whereby
the plan can completely forfeit pension benefits for an employee who leaves before five years of service.
Alternatively, the plan can delay 100 percent vesting until seven years by following an ERISA schedule
of partial vesting that begins with 20 percent vesting after three years. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(2)(B).
37. When enacted in 1974, ERISA mandated ten-year cliff vesting or graduated vesting schedules ranging
from five to fifteen years. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ch. 18, 88 Stat. 854–5
(1974). In 1986, Congress reduced the minimum vesting standards to allow a choice between five-year
cliff vesting and three- to seven-year graduated vesting. At this time, Congress created a special provision 
allowing ten-year cliff vesting for multiemployer plans created by a collective bargaining agreement. Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, ch. 1, § 1113, 100 Stat. 2, 446–7 (1986).
38. ERISA § 203(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I). Multiemployer plans are common in the garment industry, where there is
a strong union and many small employers, and in industries such as construction where workers fre-
quently stay within a small geographical area but frequently move from employer to employer (Conison, 
1993).
39. In Congressional hearings, the AFL-CIO promoted the relaxed vesting standards because (1) employees
in industries characterized by multiemployer plans already benefit from pension portability, and shorten-
ing the vesting requirements would needlessly increase the costs of administering multiemployer plans,
and (2) in these industries, the workforce size and the viability of employers tend to be very unstable, and 
collective bargaining is a better way to obtain better vesting: “The bill properly exempts multiemployer
plans . . . . In industries characterized by multiemployer plans, the typical worker is employed by dozens, 
even hundreds of different employers during his or her working years. In these industries, multiemployer 
pooled plans have evolved which allow workers to obtain pension credits despite frequent shifts from
one employer to another. This is why any vesting standard will cost a multiemployer plan more . . . . In 
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addition, the conditions of employment are inherently unstable in [such industries]. Contributors to these 
plans often include hundreds or even thousands of small companies. The incidence of business failures is 
relatively high and large fluctuations in the size of the work force are not uncommon. Given such con-
ditions in these industries, collective bargaining, because of its flexibility, is the best way to achieve the 
goal of more liberal vesting.” The Retirement Income Policy Act of 1985 and the Retirement Universal 
Security Arrangements Act of 1985: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations 
of the Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Congress, 2d Sess., 345 (letter from Robert McGlotten, 
AFL-CIO).
40. For example, the Chamber of Commerce complained that, while faster vesting increases costs and reduces 
actual retirement security, relaxed regulations for multiemployer union plans “would skew employer
decisionmaking about the type of plan with which to be involved and would disadvantage many non-
unionized companies with single employer plans that compete with unionized companies [with] multiem-
ployer plans”). See id. at 85 (statement of John N. Erlenborn, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; The National 
Manufacturers Association made essentially the same argument, id. at 98 (statement of James A. King,
National Association of Manufacturers).
41. See generally Congressional Budget Office, Tax Policy [. . .] Pensions and Other Retirement Savings
(1987) (explaining the tax advantages associated with qualified pension plans).
42. The relevant tax advantages for qualified plans may be found in 26 U.S.C. § 401(a). ERISA requires that 
a pension plan benefit “such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the employer and found 
by the Secretary not to be discriminatory in favor of highly compensated employees.” 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)
(2)(A)(i) (1988).
43. In a similar vein, ERISA’s nondiscrimination requirements for “cafeteria plans” do not apply to plans
maintained under a collective bargaining agreement. I.R.C. § 125(g)(1) (“For purposes of this section [on 
cafeteria plans], a plan shall not be treated as discriminatory if the plan is maintained under an agreement 
which the Secretary finds to be a collective bargaining agreement between employee representatives and
one or more employers”).
44. During the passage of the original ERISA bill, the House Committee on Ways and Means reported that
“[f]irst, [the provision] recognizes that employees who are represented in collective bargaining agreements 
may prefer other forms of compensation, such as cash compensation, to coverage in a plan; and second,
it makes it possible for employees who are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement to receive the 
advantages of coverage in a qualified plan where some employees of the same firm have elected through
collective bargaining agreement not to be covered by the plan.” H.R. Rep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1974), reprinted in Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1976). The problem before 1974 was the requirement that a qualified plan had to
cover at least 70 percent of employees, or that it be nondiscriminatory. See 26 U.S.C. § 410(b). Without
the exemption in 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(3)(A), when a union decided to exchange pension benefits for other
compensation, nonunion employees of the same employer would not likely get to participate in a quali-
fied plan. Specifically, in 1974 some 50 percent private-sector non-agricultural workers were not covered
by pension plans. H.R. Rep. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), at 11. So the exclusion of union
employees from the analysis seeks to increase pension coverage among nonunion workers and to give
union employees the choice between pension benefits and other compensation.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1341, part of Subtitle C of ERISA’s Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation authorization,
allows two types of plan terminations: “standard” and “distress” terminations. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)
(3), however, provides that “the corporation shall not proceed with the termination of a plan under
this section if the termination would violate the terms and conditions of an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement.” The provision was added in 1986 as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985. COBRA, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 11007, 100 Stat. 244 (1986).
46. The provision was “an endorsement of judicial decisions such as Terones [v.] Pacific States Steel Corp.,
526 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal[]. 1981), holding that a company cannot unilaterally terminate a collectively 
bargained pension plan when such termination is in violation of the terms of any agreement between the
parties.” 132 Cong. Rec. 3,792 (1986) (Rep. Clay, discussing conference report on the budget bill). See 
generally H.R. Rep. No. 300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (report by House Committee on the Budget
regarding Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985). Terones merely interpreted a collective bargain-
ing agreement and concluded that it did not allow unilateral termination by the employer. Therefore,
the effect may simply be to affirm a strong policy interest in preventing terminations, to which Terones 
alludes.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(1) exempts from the workweek requirements employees employed “in pursuance of an 
agreement, made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide 
by the [NLRB], which provides that no employee shall be employed more than one thousand and forty
hours during any period of twenty-six consecutive weeks.”
48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(1)–(2). 29 U.S.C. § 207(b)(2) provides, in singularly cryptic terms, that employers need 
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not follow the § 207(a)(1) overtime requirements for employees employed “in pursuance of an agreement, 
made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the 
[NLRB], which provides that during a specified period of fifty-two consecutive weeks the employee shall 
be employed not more than two thousand two hundred and forty hours and shall be guaranteed not less 
than one thousand eight hundred and forty hours (or not less than forty-six weeks at the normal number 
of hours worked per week, but not less than thirty hours per week) and not more than two thousand and 
eighty hours of employment for which he shall receive compensation for all hours guaranteed or worked 
at rates not less than those applicable under the agreement to the work performed and for all hours in 
excess of the guaranty which are also in excess of the maximum workweek applicable to such employee 
under subsection (a) of this section or two thousand and eighty in such period at rates not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate . . . .”
49. When Congress passed the original version of the FLSA in 1938, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060, 1063 (1938), § 7(b)(1) exempted from the normal workweek requirements 
collective bargaining agreements allowing no more than 1,000 hours of work for a 26-week period, and
§ 7(b)(2) exempted similar agreements allowing no more than 2,000 hours for a 52-week period. However, 
time-and-a-half was still required for any hours above 12 per day or 56 in a week. Evidence from a con-
feree’s explanation of the conference report suggests that the provision attempted to satisfy employers
whose peculiar operations required longer workweeks. “[T]he conference agreement contains general
exemptions to allow for further flexibility. . . . [The 26-week period/1,000 hour exemption] will take care
of the peculiar situation which exists in isolated mining and lumber camps which are located in some
cases 75 or 100 miles from civilization. . . . [The 52-week period exemption provides] an exemption from
the basic maximum hours for employers who have adopted the annual wage plan.” 83 Cong. Rec. 9,257
(1938) (Rep. Norton, explaining conference committee report). See also 83 Cong. Rec. 9,164 (1938) (Sen. 
Thomas, explaining that § 7(b) is a compromise between the alleged rigidity of the House bill and flex-
ibility of the Senate bill; “general exceptions . . . are so drawn as to encourage under proper safeguards
continuity or regularity of employment”).
In 1941, Congress raised the maximum annual total for agreements covering 52-week periods to 2,080 
hours. Act of Oct. 29, 1941, ch. 461, Pub. L. No. 283, 55 Stat. 756 (1941). In 1949, Congress raised the 
26-week maximum to 1,040 hours; for 52-week periods, the limit was set at 2,240 hours. Act of Oct. 26,
1949, ch. 736, Pub. L. No. 392, 63 Stat. 913 (1949). That bill also added the modern language requiring
a guarantee of at least 1,840 hours for annual agreements, and the modern overtime requirements for
such agreements. The bill’s purpose was “to provide for greater flexibility.” 95 Cong. Rec. 14,875 (1949) 
(summary of conference committee report). It also sought to conform the maximum hours under § 7(b)
exemptions to an average of 40 hours per week. When employees work more than the equivalent of 40
hours per week, employers are required to pay the overtime rate. 95 Cong. Rec. 14,875 (1949) (summary 
of conference committee report). See also 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2,256 (conference committee report; “[new 
§ 7(b)(1)] would permit employment under such agreements for an average workweek of 40 hours during 
any 26-week period”; “[new § 7(b)(2)] provide[s] for greater flexibility”).
For general analysis of the legislative history of the FLSA, see generally Forsythe (1939, p. 486) (origi-
nal union exemption intended to reach industries that need to send workers to remote areas, to work 
long hours for short periods of time); Cooper (1939, p. 346) (explaining the original language and early 
interpretations).
50. The overtime pay provisions in collective bargaining agreements typically conform to the normal FLSA
requirements in 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Occasionally, an agreement is negotiated which arguably falls
outside the normal workweek requirements and may be valid under the § 207(b) exemptions. See, e.g.,
Agreement, Apr. 1, 1988, State of Alaska-Inlandboatmen’s Union 20–23 (providing for a workweek of
seven consecutive 12-hour workdays, with seven consecutive days off following each completed work-
week, and time-and-a-half for hours worked during the scheduled week off).
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